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Deniable-based Privacy-preserving Authentication
against Location Leakage in Edge Computing
Shengke Zeng, Hongjie Zhang, Fei Hao, and Hongwei Li
Abstract—Edge computing provides cloud services at the edge
of the network for Internet of Things (IoT) devices. It aims
to address low latency of the network and alleviates the data
processing of the cloud. This “cloud-edge-device” paradigm
brings convenience as well as the challenges for location-privacy
protection of IoT. In the edge computing environment, the fixed
edge equipments supply the computing services for the adjacent
IoT devices. Therefore, edge computing suffers location leakage
as the connection and authentication records imply the location
of IoT devices. This work focuses on the location awareness
in edge computing environment. We adopt the “deniability”
of authentication to prevent location leakage while IoT devices
connecting to the edge nodes. In our solution, an efficient deniable
authentication based on 2-user ring signature is constructed.
The robustness of authentication makes the fixed edge equip-
ments to accept the legal end device. Besides, the deniability
of authentication cannot convince any third party that the fact
of this authentication occurred as communication transcript is
no longer an evidence for this connection. Therefore, it handles
the inherent location risk in edge computing. Compared to
efficient deniable authentications, our protocol saves 10.728%
and 14.728% computational cost, respectively.
Index Terms—Edge Computing, Location Privacy, Privacy-
preserving Authentication, Deniability.
I. INTRODUCTION
EDGE computing is a distributed computing paradigmwhich brings the cloud resources closer to IoT devices or
local edge servers. Compared to the traditional cloud comput-
ing, edge computing improves response times and gains better
bandwidth availability. In edge computing, the edge equipment
location is known and fixed as the beacon node. In order to
reduce communication costs, the IoT devices usually select the
nearest edge equipments to conduct the tasks. Obviously, edge
computing paradigm discloses the location of IoT devices to
the public.
On the other hand, authentication is necessary for IoT
devices to connect and communicate with edge equipments.
When communication occurs, it ensures that IoT devices are
the legal counterparties and the message delivered from the
source is intact. Digital signature seems to be alternative
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to realize identity authentication and message authentication.
However, the public verifiability of digital signature convinces
anyone that this authentication is made by the source. There-
fore, the location of IoT device is revealed naturally from the
communication to the edge equipment.
Location is a kind of very important privacy information
for clients as the same as the identity of users. Some research
indicates the location information is closely related to the
individual habits, activities and relationships [1]. Therefore,
the location privacy receives great concerns [2], [3], [4]. Many
solutions for protecting user’s location privacy are proposed.
The straight approach regarding to location privacy is to use
pseudonyms to make the user identity and location information
irrelevant [5]. It requires to carry great number of certificates
for user to achieve the strong privacy thus it is inefficient in
terms of storage. The second one is to enlarge the user’s loca-
tion into a region in which the accurate location information
is replaced by a coarse-grained position to prevent the attacker
from learning the exact location. Such as the spatial cloaking
technique [6], the user’s location is hidden in a large cloaked
area such that it cannot be pinpointed by the attacker. This kind
of approaches always degrade the quality of location-based
services. Mix-zone technique is also widely employed for
location privacy [7], [8], which allows the users to exchange
their pseudonyms in a dedicated area. Therefore, dummy users
have to be created for privacy if there is short of sufficient
neighboring users in the area (mix zone). K-anonymity as
another kind of approach to handle privacy [9], [10], is to
utilize other k-1 positions to cover user location. Obviously,
it requires a mass of location information to be involved in
the privacy preservation. Since the location information is
confidential in location-aware applications, the cryptographic
algorithms are employed to encrypt the location data. Homo-
morphic encryptions are used to protect the location privacy
during the localization [11], [12], [13], [14]. Undoubtedly,
cryptographic primitives provide the high-level privacy but
also lead to the heavy computation and storage. In addition,
differential privacy is also an important tool to prevent the dis-
closing sensitive information [15], [16]. Recently, differential
privacy technology is used to protect user’s location privacy
by a geo-indistinguishable task allocation [17].
In summary, the existing location privacy studies mainly
focus on preventing the location leakage to attacker or the
server which provides the location-based service, therefore,
the encryptions or obfuscated location are necessary. Thus,
both efficiency and service quality are always the victims of
privacy protection. While in the edge computing environment,
encrypting position or coarse position does not take effect
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as the edge equipment location (which is known) implies
IoT device location from connection. Intuitively, the identity
anonymity technique enables IoT device location is irrelevant
to its identity. However, it cannot defend against the attackers
with prior knowledge. We observe that if the communication
between IoT device and the fixed edge equipment is “off-
the-record”, the location privacy is preserved although the
communication peer captures the accurate location. In other
words, we make the conversation peer has no evidence to
convince any third party the fact that this interaction has
occurred. This off-the-record communication can be viewed
as the deniability capability to the protocol participants.
Indeed, deniability is an important privacy-preserving fea-
ture of cryptographic protocols. Since the authentication dur-
ing the connection between IoT device and edge equipment is
necessary. If the location privacy preservation is also required,
the authentication protocol with deniability should be con-
sidered without degrading the service quality. With deniable
authentication, the edge equipment guarantees the legality of
the IoT device. However, the edge equipment cannot prove
to any third party that the IoT device was ever involved in
this connection. In other words, this connection is “off-the-
record”, which is a critical clue to provide the client privacy.
Obviously, there is no evidence to reveal the connection to
edge equipment.
The edge equipment is fixed and its location is public,
the communication records between the IoT devices and
edge equipments imply user’s location privacy except that
user can deny the fact. In this paper, we aim to design a
deniable-based privacy-preserving authentication scheme to
provide both authentication and location privacy. Latency is
the critical evaluation metric in edge computing, therefore
the low communication capacity should be concerned for the
practicality. Intuitively, the non-interactive deniable authenti-
cation seems to be candidate. However, the non-interactive
deniable authentications can reach the partial deniability only.
It implies that the simulation can be made only by the receiver
not anyone. Therefore, the sender can deny its involvement as
the receiver may produce the indistinguishable communication
transcript. Unfortunately, partial deniability is not enough for
edge computing scenario since the receiver is an edge equip-
ment which might be a trusted party by the public. Therefore,
the communication transcript points to the client (the IoT
device). Thus, we focus on the full deniability which requires
interactive steps inevitably. In order to make authentication
protocol applicable to the Internet-based service practically,
we should consider concurrent environment. For the black-box
simulation in case of malicious verifier, the challenge-response
mechanism has to be added in the traditional approaches of
deniability. Hence, it causes extra communication round and
rewinding steps in simulation. Thus, the concurrent deniability
does not hold and the heavy communication cost also reduces
the quality of service in the edge computing. In addition,
the encryption algorithm is a common primitive to construct
deniable authentication protocols [18], [19]. The underlying
cost is that the encryption must be CCA2-secure which is
inefficient for practice. In order to be suitable for practicable
applications, we adopt different primitives to avoid CCA-
paradigm and any strong number-theoretic assumptions. The
major contributions of this work are summarized as follows.
1) We present a privacy-preserving authentication scheme
with full deniability to avoid the location leakage of IoT
devices in edge computing. The fact on deniability of the
communication is favorable for IoT devices as it does
not have any evidence to show that IoT devices have ever
been involved in some connection to the edge equipment.
It preserves location privacy of the IoT devices naturally.
2) We focus on both latency and concurrency of the edge
computing environment. Most of fully deniable authenti-
cations are built on the zero-knowledge argument against
malicious verifier, thus they require at least 4 rounds.
This security is strong but not practical in communication
applications. We observe that the communication round
can be reduced to 2 if the verifier follows protocol hon-
estly. This assumption is feasible as the receiver in edge
computing is the edge equipment which is accepted by the
public and its behavior would be honest for its reputation.
Therefore, this simplified 2-round authentication proto-
col with full deniability is optimal for the IoT devices
connection to edge equipments. In addition, our protocol
does not require extra challenge-response mechanism to
extract the witness. Therefore, the deniability does not
fail in concurrent setting such as Internet environment.
3) We avoid the need for encryption algorithms in our
construction to realize authentication, otherwise the un-
derlying encryption must be CCA2-secure which is in-
efficient. Moreover, we are not dependent on the strong
and inefficient assumptions. The existed works to achieve
the fully concurrent deniability by the timing constraints,
plaintext awareness (PA) of the underlying encryption,
knowledge of exponent assumption (KEA) assumption or
the public random oracles. It results in the inefficiency or
impracticable. Instead, we adopt the 2-user ring signature
to simulate the deniability and the full deniability is met
by the unconditional anonymity of the ring signature.
Therefore, we avoid the underlying CCA2-secure primi-
tive, the strong number-theoretic assumptions and public
random oracles.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the related work of deniable authentications.
Section III provides some preliminaries that are the building
blocks in our protocol. Section IV describes the system model
of edge computing and its security requirements. In Section V,
we propose a privacy-preserving authentication scheme with
full deniability and apply it to edge computing environment
to protect the location privacy for IoT devices. The security
of our scheme is proven and the performance is analyzed in
Section VI. Section VII concludes this work.
II. RELATED WORK
Deniable authentication was first introduced by Dolev et al.
[20] and formally studied by Dwork et al. [18]. It follows
“simulation paradigm” to realize deniability. The authentica-
tion is deniable if the conversation transcript can be simulated
without any secretes. Therefore, the participants can deny as
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someone else would produce this indistinguishable communi-
cation transcript. We call it is fully deniable if this simulation
can be run by anyone not only the verifier. The generic
technique to realize the deniable authentication is to revoke the
secret which is used to authenticate in an appropriate phase.
Thus, the early works [18], [21] require more rounds to reveal
the witness upon the receipt of the committed secret against
malicious verifiers. In this way, the simulation is perfect as
anyone with the revoked secret can simulate the statistically
indistinguishable communication transcript.
However, this kind of approach leads to heavy communica-
tion rounds inevitably. It is not suitable for the Internet-based
applications. In addition, the Internet is a fully concurrent envi-
ronment. However, the simulation in the constructions relying
on revoked witness requires rewinding steps. Obviously, this
deniability cannot hold in the concurrent scenario.
Some related works have been proposed to overcome this
barrier. There exists some approaches to reveal the witness
without rewinding steps. Di Raimondo et al. [21] demonstrated
that the assumption of plaintext-awareness [22] can be used to
extract the witness. Inspired by Raimondo’s idea, Zeng et al.
[19] presented a deniable authentication with source hiding
based on PA secure multi-receiver encryption. However, the
underlying assumption is strong. Stinson et al. [23] proposed a
2-round deniable identification protocol. Its deniability against
dishonest verifier is based on KEA assumption and random
oracles. Their scheme does not rely on any signatures or
encryptions thus it can be used in identity authentication only.
Jiang [24] used the public random oracle to extract the witness
to avoid the rewinding steps. Yao et al. [25] utilized KEA
assumption to extract the witness to ensure the deniability
in the concurrent interactive setting. Tian et al. [26] made
use of the selectively unforgeable but existentially forgeable
signature to simulate the transcript. Jiang [27] proposed a mod-
erate encryption to realize deniability without rewinding by
virtue of timed commitment. However, these works suffer the
limitations such as the strong number-theoretical assumptions,
inefficiency or public random oracles.
The direct application of deniable authentication is to design
the deniable key exchange (DKE) protocols [25], [28], [29].
As Yao et al. claimed that if the key exchange is deniable then
all the transactions using the session key generated by the key
exchange can be deniable for both the participants [25]. There
are some other applications for deniable authentication. Some
researches concern E-mail privacy [30], [31]. Li et al. [32]
applied the deniable authentication to pervasive computing
and Zeng et al. [33] utilized the deniability to construct the
privacy-preserving LBS.
III. PRELIMINARIES
We present the building blocks including the deniable
authentication and ring signature of our scheme in this section.
A. Deniable Authentication (DA)
Generally, DA protocols enable a sender to speak to the
receiver privately. In other words, the receiver can guarantee
the legality of the sender but cannot convince others that the
sender has participated in the authentication. It is realized by
without leaving the “paper trail” of the conversation. Formally,
the communication record can be simulated by someone
else and therefore, there is no evidence to show the sender
involvement. In other words, the participates (not only the
sender even the receiver) can deny the fact of an authentication
conversation.
1) Security Properties of DA Protocol: There are two roles
in authentication protocol, namely the sender (prover, denoted
as P) and the receiver (verifier, denoted as V). P authenticates
a message m to V. The fundamental security requirements of
the deniable authentication protocol are the Completeness, the
Authentication (Unforgeability) and the Deniability.
• Completeness. V accepts the authentication for the mes-
sage m with overwhelming probability if P and V follow
the authentication protocol honestly.
• Authentication (Unforgeability). This property states
that an attacker A can not pretend to be the sender
P to complete authentication. Consider the probabilistic
polynomial time attacker A trying to forge a message. It
adaptively chooses a sequence of arbitrary messages m1,
m2, · · · and asks some good participant Pi to authenticate
mi. We say that A succeeds if V accepts A’s authenti-
cation to message m /∈ {mi}i=1,2,··· as Pi and A does
not have Pi’s secret. The authentication (unforgeability)
requirement is that the probability of success of A is
negligible.
• Deniability. This property states that P and V can deny
the involvement of authentication. Formally, the deni-
ability can be captured by the simulation paradigm.
The adversary A’s view of this conversation can be
simulated by a simulator M without the secret of the
sender P and the two transcripts (the real one and the
simulated one) have the same distribution. Therefore,
the real authentication transcript can not be convinced
by others as it can be performed by running M. In
addition, the concurrent deniability should be considered
in the interactive fashion. In the Internet-based environ-
ment, the attacker A may launch a concurrent interaction
with P by arbitrary interleaved steps. The concurrent
deniability should hold even in such setting. We denote
the interaction between A and real sender P by Γrea,
denote the interaction between A and the simulator M
by Γsim. The authentication is deniable if a distinguisher
D’s view in Γrea and Γsim are indistinguishable. Formally,
|Pr[D(view(A,Γrea)) = 1] − Pr[D(view(A,Γsim)) =
1]| ≈ negl(κ), where negl(κ) is a negligible function
for the security parameter κ.
2) Review of DA Protocol : Let us review the traditional
deniable authentication protocol proposed by Dwork et al
[18] to explain the Authentication (Unforgeability) and the
Deniability. In this protocol, P has a public-private keypair
(vP, sP) of a non-malleable encryption algorithm E(·). P and
V perform the interactive deniable authentication protocol as
shown in Fig. 1.
Only the legal sender P can get the right r with the decryp-
tion key sP. Therefore, the correct r implies P’s authentication.
On the other hand, the exposure of r in Round 3 is the vital
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Round 1. V→ P: V randomly chooses value r and computes c = EvP(m ‖ r).
Round 2. P→ V: Upon receiving message c, P decrypts c by its private key sP and obtains the suffix of plaintext, namely
r. Technically, P returns d = EvP(r) instead of r. d can be viewed as the commitment of r as E(·) is non-malleable.
Round 3. V → P: Upon receiving message d, V opens c using the random encryption coin ρ used in the encryption in
the Round 1 and returns (r, ρ) to P.
Round 4. P→ V: Upon receiving message (r, ρ), P checks the correct r and opens d by revoking the random encryption
coin σ used in the encryption in the Round 2.
Finally, V accepts P’s authentication if d is opened correctly.
Fig. 1. Dwork et al.’s Deniable Authentication Protocol
step to realize the deniability. With r, anyone can produce d
even without the secret sP. We can see that this simulation is
perfect after seeing r. Therefore, we say this perfect simulation
run by anyone is realized by rewinding steps. Note that, this
kind of deniability does not hold in concurrent environment
due to its rewinding steps. Dwork et al. [18] handled this
problem by timing assumption.
3) Full Deniability v.s. Partial Deniability: The advantage
of non-interactivity is reflected in the communication over-
head. Non-interactivity handles concurrency problem naturally
as it requires 1 round. However, the non-interactive deniable
authentication achieves partial deniability only. Obviously,
the transcripts in the non-interactive deniable authentication
protocol cannot be simulated by anyone otherwise it conflicts
the unforgeability. The generic construction of non-interactive
deniable authentication is to calculate the authentication tag
with the sender’s secret and the receiver’s public key [32]. In
this way, the receiver is assured that a message originated from
the sender but cannot prove this to any third party, just like
the designated-verifier signature. However, the transcript can
only be simulated by using receiver’s secret. In other words,
it realizes only the partial deniability.
The full deniability states that the conversation transcript
can be simulated by anyone not only the receiver. It is proven
to be simulatable with challenge-response sub-protocol. There-
fore, it must be realized by the interactive steps. The full deni-
ability is more practical in terms of strong privacy compared
to partial deniability. Since only the receiver can simulate
the transcript in the partially deniable authentication. If the
receiver (i.e., service provider) is accepted by the public, it is
unfair for the sender (i.e., client). Therefore, we focus on the
full deniability in our application.
B. Ring Signature
The ring signature scheme is used to sign a message
anonymously. Given a valid ring signature σ w.r.t. a message
m and a set of public keys PK = {PK1, . . . , PKn}, any verifier
cannot decide which user in the ring PK is the actual signer
even the secret keys of all the users in PK are exposed.
The syntax of the ring signature is as follows.
Definition 1 (Ring Signature). A ring signature scheme is a
triple of algorithms (KGen, RSig, RVer). Formally:
1) A probabilistic key generation algorithm KGen(1κ). Given
the security parameter κ, output the keypair (PKi, SKi)
for user i. That is (PKi, SKi)← KGen(1κ).
2) A probabilistic ring signing algorithm RSig(m,PK; SKs).
Given a message m, a ring PK and the private (signing)
key SKs of the signer s (PKs ∈ PK), output the ring
signature σ. That is σ ← RSig(m,PK; SKs).
3) A deterministic verification algorithm RVer(m, σ,PK).
Given the ring signature σ, the message m with respect to
the ring of public keys PK, determine whether σ is valid
w.r.t. (m,PK). That is to check RVer(m, σ,PK) ?= 1.
The properties of a secure ring signature contain the
Completeness, Unconditional Anonymity and Unforgeability.
Formally:
Completeness. For any {PKi, SKi}ni=1 output by KGen(1κ),
any s ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and any message m, we have
RVer(m, RSig(m,PK; SKs), PK) = 1, where PK =
{PK1, . . . , PKn}.
Unconditional Anonymity. This property states that an at-
tacker is not able to tell which user in a ring PK produced
the signature σ although it obtains the signing keys of all the
users in PK. Formally, we consider the anonymity game:
Given a ring signature scheme (KGen, RSig, RVer) and an
adversary A, the anonymity game is as follows:
1) For i = 1, 2, . . ., generate (PKi, SKi) ← KGen(1κ), A is
given R = {PK1, PK2, . . .}.
2) A is given access to an oracle Osign(s, m,PK) which
returns RSig(m,PK; SKs). We require PK ⊆ R and
PKs ∈ PK.
3) A is given SK1, SK2, . . . , A outputs a message m, distinct
indices so, s1, and a ring PK for PKs0 , PKs1 ∈ PK.
Furthermore, A is given σ ← RSig(m,PK; SKsb)
4) A outputs a bit b′ and succeeds if b′ = b.
Definition 2 (Anonymity against full key exposure). A ring
signature scheme is unconditionally anonymous if the success
probability of A in the above anonymity game is negligibly
close to 1/2.
Remark 1. This is a weak definition for the anonymity except
that full key exposure is required. Indeed, this model does
not consider such attack that the adversary would generate
public keys in arbitrary manner (i.e., possibly depend on
the public keys of the honest users). Therefore, Bender et
al. [34] defined a stronger model, and they considered the
adversarially-chosen keys attack in which the adversary must
know the actual signer. However, it is not necessary for our
scheme to depend on such stronger model since we require
the adversary should be unable to prove to a third party the
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Fig. 2. The Illustration of Edge Computing System
actual signer even though it knows someone. On the other
hand, we require the unconditional anonymity w.r.t. full key
exposure such that the transcript can be simulated by anyone
to reach the full deniability.
Unforgeability. The intuitive notion of unforgeability is that
a forger should be unable to output (PK, m, σ) such that
RVer(σ, m,PK) = 1 where the corresponding signing keys
in PK are unknown to the forger. Formally, we consider the
unforgeability game:
Given a ring signature scheme (KGen, RSig, RVer) and a
forger F , the unforgeability game is working as follows:
1) Generate (PKi, SKi) ← KGen(1κ) for i = 1, 2, . . ., F is
given R = {PK1, PK2, . . .}.
2) F is given access to a signing oracle Osign(s, m,PK)
which returns RSig(m, PK; SKs). We require PK ⊆ R
and PKs ∈ PK.
3) F outputs (PK∗, m∗, σ∗), succeeds if PK∗ ⊆ R,
RVer(σ∗, m∗,PK∗) = 1 and F never queried Osign(·,
m∗,PK∗).
Definition 3 (Unforgeability). A ring signature scheme is
unforgeable if the success probability of F in the above
unforgeability game is negligible.
IV. EDGE COMPUTING MODEL AND ITS SECURITY GOALS
A. Edge Computing System Overview
The centralization of resources in cloud computing increases
the average network latency and jitter. While edge computing
immigrates the tasks from the central cloud to the distributed
edge equipments to provide convenience for the local IoT
devices. As shown in Fig. 2, the edge equipments are deployed
close to IoT devices. The edge equipments’ location are public
and fixed, the communication record between IoT device and
edge equipment implies IoT device location. Therefore, the
location privacy of IoT devices should be considered in the
edge computing.
B. Security Requirement
During the access procedure, there are two aspects should
be concerned.
Authentication. Authentication is necessary during the com-
munication between IoT devices and edge equipments, which
includes identity authentication and message authentication.
When the IoT devices connect to the edge equipments, the
identity of IoT device must be confirmed. When the commu-
nication occurs between the two entities, the message integrity
also should be considered. Clearly, password-based authentica-
tions suffers insecurity even though it is efficient and practical.
And, key-based authentication avoids non-randomness of the
passwords and provides the stronger security. In such kind of
authentication, user should prove its knowledge of the public
key or knowing the shared secret.
Location Privacy Leakage. As shown in Fig. 2, the edge
equipments are close to IoT devices. In addition, the edge e-
quipments are fixed and public, its location implies the location
of end devices. Therefore, it leaks the client location inherently
since the authentication transcript and the connection record
are the evidence to validate the fact of IoT device involvement.
Therefore, a secure communication scheme in the edge
computing with location awareness should meet the following
security requirements.
• Authentication. The edge equipment authenticates the IoT
device to identify the client and to assure the message in-
tegrity. Formally, a forger F can query the authentication
transcripts for its adaptive chosen messages m1, m2, · · ·
from its challenger. Finally, F forges an accepted authen-
tication on (m∗, PKi) without knowing the secret of PKi.
The success probability of F in the authentication game is
denoted by Pr[SuccauthF ]. We require that authentication
is satisfied if Pr[SuccauthF ] is negligible.
• Location Privacy. The client location privacy is preserved
in the authentication when it accesses to the fixed edge
equipment. It seems paradoxical and challengeable. A
feasible way is to make the authentication transcript sim-
ulatable. In other words, we require that a distinguisher
D’s views in a real conversation transcript Γrea and
a simulated Γsim are indistinguishable. Therefore, the
real client can deny that it communicated with the edge
equipment before as the conversation transcript may be
simulated by others. Thus, there is no evidence to show
IoT device location.
V. PRIVACY-PRESERVING AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
AGAINST LOCATION LEAKAGE
We present a simplified privacy-preserving authentication
protocol with full deniability against location leakage for
edge computing environment in this section. Authentication
transcript leaks the IoT device location while it connecting
to the fixed edge equipment. Therefore, we adopt the full
deniability to make it is confident for IoT device to deny
the fact of communication record. This kind of authentication
does not expose IoT device location even the edge equipment
accepts IoT device’s communication. We observe that the
verifier in this scenario can be assumed honest and thus we
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The sender denoted as P authenticates a message m to the receiver denoted as V. Let (SKP, PKP) denote the private/public
key pair for P and (RSig(·), RVer(·)) denote the ring signature scheme.
Round 1. V→ P: V randomly chooses a value PK and sends PK to P.
Round 2. P→ V: Upon receiving PK, P generates a 2-user ring signature σ on m, that is σ = RSig(m, (PKP, PK); SKP) and
sends σ to V.
Finally, V accepts P’s authentication if σ is a valid ring signature w.r.t. (m, PKP, PK). That is RVer(σ, m, PKP, PK) = 1.
Fig. 3. Our Deniable Authentication Protocol
can simplify and optimize this fully deniable authentication
protocol with 2 rounds to adapt to IoT. Besides, the concurrent
communication must be considered for Internet-based applica-
tions. Under this setting, the interaction executions in the fully
deniable authentication protocol can be arbitrarily interleaved
by the attacker. Thus the deniability may fail. If the rewinding
steps in the traditional deniable authentication protocol are not
necessary, the concurrent deniability can be reached naturally.
Moreover, we avoid CCA-paradigm for constructing authenti-
cation. Therefore, it is practical and suitable for the Internet
environment. In this section, we first introduce our generic
construction of the underlying deniable authentication protocol
and then we instantiate this deniable authentication with a
concrete 2-member ring signature scheme to implement a
privacy-preserving authentication protocol for edge computing
against client location leakage.
A. Deniable Authentication Protocol
Most deniable authentications are constructed by CCA2-
secure encryptions as shown in Fig. 1. The underlying building
block is impractical. It is more significant to construct the
efficient protocols based on primitives with looser require-
ments. Moreover, the deniability in CCA-paradigm deniable
authentications is proven to be black-box simulatable and
hence has to add the challenge-response sub-protocol with
the secret revocation. It incurs rewinding steps in the sim-
ulation. Therefore, the deniability property in CCA-paradigm
deniable authentication holds only if copies of the protocol are
performed sequentially. It is impractical in the Internet-based
service which is under the concurrent environment. Stinson-
Wu scheme [23] does not rely on any signatures or encryptions
but only to realize identity authentication. Recently, Zeng et
al. [35] made use of projective hash functions to construct au-
thentication protocol with deniability. In this section, we adopt
another building block to avoid CCA-paradigm encryption.
We propose an authentication with full deniability. Different
with the traditional approaches (i.e., CCA paradigm) to reach
fully deniable authentication as shown in Fig. 1, we construct
it by employing the ring signature with 2 members. Our
communication round is only 2 which is optimal round in
the fully deniable authentication and it reaches the concurrent
deniability. Indeed, the simulation in our protocol does not
require the rewinding steps and is therefore perfect although
there exists adversaries who may schedule the executions
or delay messages in arbitrary ways. While most interactive
deniable authentications involve rewinding steps to be black-
box simulatable, hence the timing assumption is necessary to
handle concurrency problem. Our instantiation presented in
Section V-B shows it is efficient and practical.
Intuitively, 2-user ring signature scheme solves the authen-
tication and privacy naturally. However, we do not adopt the
traditional way (i.e., the 2-user ring containing the sender and
the receiver) to construct the ring signature. Otherwise, either
the sender or receiver must be convinced to be involved in this
conversation due to the publicly verification of ring signature.
Our inspiration is that: the one is the sender P’s real public
key PKP, the other one is a logic “public key” PK which is a
random value challenged by the receiver. The sender responses
it by generating a ring signature σ with m and the 2-size
ring PK = {PKP, PK}. That is σ ← RSig(m,PK; SKP). The
corresponding private key of the logic public key PK is only
known by the receiver. Thus, a valid ring signature implies
that the receiver is assured that m originated from the sender
P. The authentication is achieved. On the other hand, the full
deniability is realized since the authentication tag σ can be
simulated by anyone. Indeed, the simulator randomly chooses
a value r to simulate the logic public key R which has the
same distribution with PK. Note that PK is just a random value
chosen by the receiver V (not its pubic key) if V performs
protocol honestly. Therefore, the simulated ring signature
σsim = RSig(m, (PKP, R); r) produced by the “private key” r is
indistinguishable from σ due to the unconditional anonymity
property of ring signature, see Section III-B. Therefore, the
full deniability is achieved without rewinding steps and it
can hold in concurrent setting also. Our 2-round deniable
authentication is shown in Fig. 3.
We briefly present the authentication and full deniability of
our generic 2-round deniable authentication as shown in Fig.
3. The formal proof will be elaborated in the next section.
Our generic 2-round deniable authentication shown in Fig.
3 satisfies authentication property of deniable authentication
(DA) protocol. Actually, an adversary A violates this property
if it forges a ring signature σ which passes the verification
algorithm RVer(·). Note that, the ring signature σ is generated
by SKP or the secret of PK if the ring signature algorithm is
sound. Obviously, SKP and the secret of PK are not known
to A. Therefore, our DA protocol meets authentication if the
underlying ring signature algorithm is unforgeable.
Our generic 2-round deniable authentication shown in Fig. 3
satisfies full deniability property of DA protocol. This property
follows the unconditional anonymity of the underlying ring
signature algorithm. Due to the unconditional anonymity of the
ring signature scheme (RSig(·), RVer(·)), the ring signature
σ generated by SKP has the indistinguishable distribution to
that generated by the secret of PK. Since PK is a random
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value chosen by the honest verifier V, anyone can pick random
value to generate the same distributed PK′. Obviously, this ring
signature σ′ produced by the secret of PK′ is valid and has the
same distribution as σ. In other words, anyone can simulate a
indistinguishable conversation transcript. The full deniability
follows.
B. Application to Edge Computing against Location Leakage
We instantiate our deniable authentication described above
with a concrete 2-user ring signature scheme and implement
it on edge computing environment to preserve client location
privacy.
Setup. The edge computing system runs this algorithm to
publish the parameters Para as follows: Choose a safe prime
q, let G and G1 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of order q
that are associated to an efficiently computable bilinear pairing
ê : G×G→ G1. g is the generator of G. Choose a collision-
free hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G. Para = (q,G,G1, ê, g, H).
KeyGen. The client Ui (e.g. IoT device) runs this algorithm
to generate its keypair (PKi, SKi) as follows: Choose xi ← Zq
and compute yi = gxi . Set SKi = xi and PKi = yi. The public
key PKi of Ui is authenticated by the certificate system.
Access Authentication. UP submits the connection request
to the nearest edge equipment, say EE, with its certificate
CertP which includes PKP. If CertP is valid, EE starts this
authentication as follows:
1) EE → UP: EE randomly chooses a value h ← G and
sends h to UP.
2) UP → EE: Upon receiving h, UP generates a 2-user ring
signature σ as follows:
a) Choose r ← Zq;
b) Compute H(m):
• If this is an identity authentication, m = IDP‖PKP
where IDP is the identity of UP.
• If this is a message authentication, m is the message
delivered from UP to EE.
c) Output σ =
(
hxP · H(m)r, gr
)
.
σ is the ring signature w.r.t. (m, {PKP, h}). UP sends σ to
EE to complete its authentication.
Finally, EE accepts UP’s authentication if σ = (A,B) is
a valid ring signature w.r.t. (m, {PKP, h}). That is to check
whether ê(yP, h) · ê(B, H(m))
?
= ê(A, g).
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION
In this section, we analyze the security and performance
of our protocol. Since the verification of Correctness of our
protocol is straightforward, in what follows we will prove
that our protocol meets other two properties: Authentication
and Location Privacy, which have been presented in security
model. Then we provide the performance evaluation for our
instantiation and the comparisons of the underlying deniable
authentication to the related constructions regarding to com-
putational cost.
A. Security Analysis
We focus on the security of the instantiation for our deniable
authentication protocol. As presented in the security model
in Section IV, this privacy-preserving authentication protocol
should concern Authentication and Full Deniability if it is
applied to be against location leakage in edge computing
environment.
1) Authentication: The communication between the client
(IoT device) and the server (edge equipment) should concern
the identity authentication and message authentication. This
authentication is provided by the soundness (unforgeability)
of the underlying deniable authentication protocol. We apply
2-user ring signature scheme to preserve the authentication.
Indeed, the generated ring signature σ is bounded to two
public keys PKP and h. Due to the unforgeability of the ring
signature, only the member who knows the secret of PKP or h
can generate a valid signature. The receiver (i.e., EE) is assured
that σ originated from the sender UP (who knows the secret
of PKP) since h’s secret is unknown to anyone. Intuitively, our
protocol meets authentication due to the unforgeability of the
underlying ring signature scheme. Theorem 1 formally proves
this property.
Theorem 1. Our protocol described in Section V-B satis-
fies authentication if Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH)
assumption holds and the hash function H is a random oracle.
Proof. Suppose A is the adversary against the soundness of
our protocol presented in Section V-B. We construct A′ to
break the unforgeability of underlying 2-user ring signature
scheme. C is the challenger of A′ whose goal is to solve CDH
problem. C controls the random oracle. Given a CDH problem
instance (g, ga, gb) over the pairing group (G,G1, g, q, ê), C
runs A and A′ as follows.
C sets the sender public key as PKP = ga. When A queries
authentication to arbitrary messages m1, m2, . . . adaptively, A′
acts as sender P and A acts as receiver V by given gb. A′
performs this authentications to A as follows.
When mi is queried by A by sending h = gb to A′ according
to our protocol, A′ makes hash query H-query H(mi) to C. Note
that, before any hash queries are made, C chooses i∗ ∈ [1, qH ]
where qH is the number of hash queries. If mi is already in
C’s hash list (which is empty at the beginning), C responds
following its hash list. Otherwise, C chooses wi ← Zq ran-
domly and sets H(mi) = gwi if i = i∗ and sets H(mi) = gb+wi
if i 6= i∗. Then A′ makes ring signature queries to C on mi.
If i = i∗, C aborts this query. Otherwise, C chooses r′i ← Zq








Finally, A′ responds σ to A to complete its authentication
to mi. Obviously, the simulation of A′ is perfect and A
accepts A′’s authentication since the returned σ = (A,B)
satisfies the verification ê(yP, h) · ê(B, H(m)) = ê(A, g), where
H(m) = gb+wi .
A pretends to P to make fake authentication to m∗ after its
authentication queries to m1, m2, . . .. Obviously, A succeeds
if and only if its production σm∗ = (A∗, B∗) satisfies the
verification equation ê(yP, h) · ê(B∗, H(m∗)) = ê(A∗, g). It
helps A′ to break the unforgeability of the underlying ring
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signature undoubtedly. If m∗ is the i∗-th queried message in
the hash list, it helps C to solve CDH problem indeed. In





Therefore, C obtains gab by A∗/(B∗)wi∗ .
Therefore, we have that if A breaks the authentication
property of our protocol with probability ε after making qH
queries to the random oracle, C solves the CDH problem with
ε/qH .
2) Location Privacy: In the edge computing environment,
the location of edge equipment reveals client location during
the connection and communication. Our protocol makes use of
“deniability” to handle this problem. If the IoT device can deny
its involvement in this authentication, there is no evidence
for its connection. The location privacy is preserved naturally.
Thus, the deniability of our protocol indicates location privacy
of IoT devices.
Following the security model of deniable authentication
protocol described in Section III, we use simulation fashion
to prove the deniability of our protocol. If a simulator (run
by anyone) can simulate the authentication transcript without
participant’s secret, the full deniability is satisfied. The formal
proof is presented as follows.
Theorem 2. Our protocol described in Section V-B satisfies
the full deniability if the receiver follows our protocol honestly.
Proof. For the underlying ring signature algorithm, we argue
it is unconditionally anonymous against full key exposure.
Indeed, the underlying ring signature algorithm outputs the
signature σ = (A,B) = (hxPH(m)r, gr), which can be
rewritten as (yωP H(m)
r
, gr) where ω = logg h.
Note that, the value h ∈ G is randomly chosen by verifier V
(EE) in our protocol. Therefore, we require V honestly to return
a random value from G in the first flow. In the simulation, the
simulator S chooses ω̄ ← Zq randomly to simulate h, i.e.,
h̄ = gω̄ . Obviously, h̄ has the same distribution as h and
the simulated h is perfect. With the secret ω̄, the simulator
S generates σ̄ = (Ā, B̄) = (yω̄P H(m)
r̄
, gr̄). Obviously, σ̄ is
“identical” to σ as ê(yP, h̄) · ê(B̄, H(m)) = ê(Ā, g) holds.
Clearly, this simulated transcript (h̄, σ̄) (produced by any-
one) is indistinguishable from the real one. Therefore, the
actual sender UP can fully deny its involvement as this authen-
tication transcript for connection to EE may be “fabricated”
by anyone and the location privacy is preserved.
B. Performance Evaluation
We make use of deniable authentication (DA) protocol
to preserve authentication and privacy while IoT devices
accessing and communicating with the edge equipment. The
performance of the underlying DA protocol mainly affects
the efficiency of our protocol in Section V-B. Therefore, we
analyze the performance of our work from two sides: we first
analyze our underlying DA protocol theoretically and give the
performance comparisons among related constructions; then
we implement our protocol on the specific edge computing
environment to show its efficiency.
1) Efficiency of Underlying DA Protocol: Our underlying
DA protocol as described in Fig. 3 employs 2-user ring
signature algorithm and challenge-response phase to realize
authentication and full deniability. With this design and under
the assumption of honest verifier, our DA protocol is only
2 rounds, which is the optimal communication round in the
fully deniable authentication protocols. Besides that, our DA
protocol realizes concurrent deniability even. Since we do
not require “rewinding” steps to simulate the authentication
transcript, the copies of the protocol are not necessarily
performed sequentially. Therefore, our DA protocol with both
optimal round and concurrent denibaility can be applied to
Internet-based service practically.
There are some other related DA protocols to be compared
in this qualitative research. Dwork’s scheme [18] is construct-
ed by encryptions and the underlying encryption algorithm is
required to be CCA2 secure. Their work requires 4 rounds
to realize full deniability and the deniability does not hold
in concurrent setting. From authentication type point of view,
this work supports both message authentication and identity
authentication. Jiang’s scheme [24] relies on public random
oracle to realize 3-round mutual authentication (and 2 rounds
if one-way authentication). The communication transcript is
simulated without rewinding steps, thus it realizes concurrent
deniability. Yao et al.’s work [25] depends on non-malleable
zero-knowledge proofs, thus the underlying communication
round is heavy. The communication round of their scheme
is 2+ means that the round of one-way authentication is 2
whereas its NMZK may incur extra communication round.
Stinson-Wu scheme [23] depends on KEA assumption to
realize a 2-round full deniable identification protocol. It does
not rely on any underlying signatures or encryptions. However,
KEA is not the standard assumption. The above three works
reach identity authentication only. Li et al’s protocols [32]
are 1 round which seem communication optimal. However,
it achieves partial deniability only. In order to show these
protocols clearly, we conclude their features in Table I and the
communication round is in one-way authentication fashion.
2) Efficiency of Our Instantiation: Qualitatively, Table I
reports that our scheme has superior properties in both com-
munication and security. Our communication round is optimal
for the full deniability, therefore we have lower latency un-
doubtedly. In this subsection, we consider the computation
performance quantitatively in the specific edge computing
environment. The efficient non-interactive deniable authen-
tication protocols from [32] are chosen as the comparison
objects. Although their protocols are 1 round, their deniability
is weak. Our experiment shows the computational cost of these
protocols.
The end devices equipped with processor of Intel(R) Pen-
tium(R) CPU G4500 3.50GHz and RAM of 4.00GB are used
to simulate the IoT devices. We choose 80-bit level to re-
implement their protocols and we choose Type A pairing from
free C library PBC following their implementation. Fig. 4
reports the experimental results.
We run our protocol, HDA-1 and HDA-2 in [32] 20 times to
get 60 records totally. The average cost is also calculated and
we make 3 lines of every 21 records from each protocols. And
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TABLE I
COMPARISONS OF DENIABLE AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS
Scheme Deniability Round Concurrency pRO Assumption CCA-paradigm Authentication Type
Dwork’s scheme [18] Full 4 × - Standard Yes Message & Identity
Jiang’s scheme [24] Full 2 X X Standard No Identity
Yao’s scheme [25] Full 2+ X - Standard No Identity
Stinson-Wu scheme [23] Full 2 X - KEA No Identity
Li’s scheme [32] Partial 1 X - Standard No Message & Identity
Our scheme Full 2 X - Standard No Message & Identity
Fig. 4. Experimental Time Cost
TABLE II
EXPERIMENTAL RESULT ANALYSIS
Protocol Level Cost Difference Rate
Ours 80-bit 42.15335ms - -
HDA-1 80-bit 47.2193ms 5.06595 10.728%
HDA-2 80-bit 49.41545ms 7.2621 14.696%
under the 3 lines, we compute 42 records of difference cost,
difference between HDA-1 and our protocol is yellow bar,
difference between HDA-2 and our protocols is blue bar. These
bars graphically illusrate the cost saving between different
protocols.
Table II shows our experimental result with average cost.
We find that our protocol saves 10.728% cost comparing with
HDA-1 and 14.728% cost comparing to HDA-2.
VII. CONCLUSION
Authentication in edge computing environment incurs loca-
tion leakage, we propose a privacy-preserving authentication
scheme with full deniability to protect the location of IoT
devices. Our underlying protocol has only 2 communication
rounds which achieves the optimal communication latency
for the full deniability. Our scheme does not rely on CCA-
paradigm encryptions, rewinding steps and any strong number-
theoretical assumptions, thus it is practical in the concurrent
Internet-based environment. Compared to the existing efficient
deniable authentications, our scheme has better performance
for end devices in terms of computational cost. Therefore, it
adapts to the resource-constrained IoT devices.
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